Single Question. Whether Penitence in Extremities Avails for Salvation

1. “It is necessary to know also etc     .” [Lombard, Sent. IV d.20 ch.1 n.1].

2. The twentieth distinction, about which I ask whether penitence in extremities avails for salvation.

3. That it does not:

Augustine in a certain sermon [Ps.-Augustine, Sermon 393, ‘On Penitence’, in Lombard, Sent. IV d.20 ch.1 n.2, taken from Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 33 q.3 d.7 ch.2] says, speaking of someone thus penitent, “We do not presume that he departs hence well.”

4. The same [Ps.-Augustine, On True and False Penitence ch.17 n.33] (and it is in Lombard’s text [ibid., nn.4-5] and in Gratian [ibid. d.7 ch.6]): “It is very dangerous and near to destruction to put off the remedy of penitence until death.” From this authority the argument is as follows: he who exposes himself to danger of eternal death sins mortally; but the sort of person who delays penitence until death is like this;     therefore etc     . There is confirmation from Augustine in a sermon on the Holy Innocents [Ps.-Augustine, Sermon 220 n.2], “The sinner is struck by this observation, that he dies forgetful of himself who, while he lived, was forgetful of God.”

5. Again, on Ecclesiasticus 17.27, “Alive and healthy will you confess,” there is this remark of Augustine [Ps.-Augustine, Sermon 393, ibid. supra n.3], “Do penance while you are healthy. If you have done so, you have done so at the time you could have sinned. If you wish to be penitent when you cannot sin, sins have dismissed you but not you them.” From this as follows: no penitence suffices for salvation unless it be voluntary; but he who is penitent at the extreme of death has dismissed his sins but they him (according to Augustine);     therefore etc     .

6. Again, nothing is ordained by a legislator that is an occasion for transgressing the law, and especially an occasion for many (this is plain, because then the legislator would per se do something that was for the destruction of his own law); but that a late penitence avails [for salvation] is an occasion for continuing sin for the whole of life; for who would not continually sin for his whole life if a brief penitence would in the end save him?     Therefore etc     .

7. Again, mortal sin is dismissed for no one save through some temporal penalty corresponding to the sin; but such a one who is penitent at the extreme of death pays no penalty, or at any rate not sufficient or corresponding to the sin.

8. If it be said that he will pay in purgatory the temporal penalty due - on the contrary: he who dies in mortal sin will be damned at once;     therefore he who dies in grace will be saved at once, and consequently will pay no penalty after this life.

9. On the contrary:

Augustine [Ps.-Augustine On True etc     . ch.17 n.33, Gratian, ibid. ch.5, and Lombard ibid. n.6; supra n.4]. “If penitence come in the final opening of life, it saves and frees.” Lombard proves it by adding at once [citing Hugh of St. Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, II p.14 ch.5], “Very late was the penitence of the thief, but Christ’s indulgence was not late,” about which thief is Luke 23.42-43. He proves it again through Ezekiel 18.21-22; 33.14-16 [Ps.-Augustine, On True etc. ibid., Lombard, ibid. supra n.4: “I believe that he who said, ‘in what hour the sinner laments and is converted [lit. turned around], his life will live’, said that the one ‘turned around’ not ‘turned’ merely will live; he is ‘turned’ I think who grieves over a crime, but he is ‘turned around’ who grieves over every variety of it” [d.14 n.128 supra]

I. To the Question

A. Two Conclusions

10. In this question are two conclusions that are sufficiently certain.

The first is this: true penitence, whether interior, or exterior along with reception of the sacrament of penitence, suffices for the salvation of anyone in extremities.

11. The second conclusion is this, that the penitence that seems to be obtained in extremities is scarcely true penitence sufficient for salvation, because it is difficult then to have true penitence.

B. Proof of the Conclusions

1. Proof of the First Conclusion

12. The first conclusion is plain from Augustine, and it is in the text [Ps.-Augustine, On True..., n.4 supra]: “Since God is always powerful, he is able to help even in death those whom it pleases; since therefore fruitful penitence is the work not of man but of God, he can inspire it whenever his mercy wants.”

13. It is also plain by reason, that whether interior penitence alone through merit by congruity (if had in extremities) dispose to justification, or whether the sacrament of penitence operate by way of sacrament - if the latter or former is had by anyone in extremities, the same idea of receiving grace is had by him as is also had in another penitent; and consequently grace will be received and so salvation.

2. Proof of the Second Conclusion

14. Proof of the second conclusion:

First, because then the use of free choice, or the use of free reason and will, is impeded, by inherent pain or fear. Now I do not mean that he is in extremities who is burdened by a sickness that is of common rule curable (as by a tertian fever or the like), nor he who dies suddenly, the cause of whose death still not appear. But I mean him who is judged, from evident causes already in place, to be near death, according to the lower causes that operate for the most part (as in the case of an infirmity when he is already reaching a level despaired of in the judgment of doctors, or in the case of other dangers, as drowning, wounding, and the like, when death is at once imminent). In these cases, I say, there is either very great pain in the sense part of the soul or very great fear. And both vehement sufferings are of a nature to impede free use of reason and will, because according to Augustine 83 Questions q.36 n.1, passions caused by distressing things move more than passions caused by delightful things. But a vehement passion of delight sometimes wholly, or almost, impedes the use of reason, as is said in City of God XIV ch.16, and an act of displeasure about sin, in order for it to be sufficient for true penitence

(whether internal only or for worthy reception of the sacrament of penitence), requires free use of reason and will [Ord. III d.15 n.62, a fuller treatment].

15. If you say that the pain or fear that is present does not totally impede intellect or will, I concede it. But it does impede them a lot, and consequently it is possible to have a weak and imperfect use of intellect and will, which scarcely suffices for the displeasure sufficient and required for true penitence.

16. This argument [n.14] is touched on by Augustine [cited by Lombard; the words from Hugh of St. Victor, n.9 supra], “So great a torment sometimes binds the members and pain oppresses the sense, that scarcely is a man able to think of anything else.”

17. Second, in order for displeasure to be ordered, it must have its due circumstances, and especially the circumstance of the end and the principal active principle, namely so that it may be voluntary and for the sake of God. But it is difficult then to have an act thus circumstanced. First, because he who up to then was impenitent does not seem he is then wresting from himself a new displeasure save by fear of imminent penalty (for the presumption is that if he were removed, as before, from the penalty, he would not wrest from himself such displeasure, as he did not before). Second, because the cause of this displeasure seems to be something at least simply involuntary, namely the near expectation of death; but that is involuntary; and what does not happen save on the supposition of something involuntary is not simply voluntary (just as someone does not altogether voluntarily throw merchandise into the sea if he only throws it on the supposition of an endangerment he does not want) - at any rate, what is only voluntary in this way does not seem accepted much by someone else, nor does it seem done much for love of him.

18. This argument [n.17] is touched on by Augustine in the text [Ps.-Augustine, OnTrue..., Lombard, supra n.4], “It is necessary,” he says, “not to fear death much but to love; for God seeks liberty not necessity of choice, charity not fear, so as to be able to delete sins committed; let not him, then, who is penitent fear so much the penalty, but be anxious for the glory.”More accurately: “for God, so as to be able to delete sins committed, seeks liberty not necessity of choice... Not therefore in fear alone does man live. He then who repents late should not only fear God the Judge, but love also God the Just; let God not be feared for penalty, but loved for glory.” ⁶⁰

19. Third reason, because a bad habit continued up to that point [of death] draws one away from act of penitence.

20. And this argument is touched on by [Ps.-]Augustine in the text [ibid.], “One must be afraid for a late penitent, since the children whom he wrongly loved are present, and his wife and the world are calling to him; a late penitence is wont to deceive many;” meaning: these delightful things are present in themselves, or in strongly impressed imaginations. And whether this way or that, habits long continued draw to themselves, by their vehemence, things to be loved inordinately, and consequently they put much difficulty in the way of having much displeasure about them.

21. The fourth reason: the more that someone is less a lord of his own acts, the more is an intenser displeasure required for a disposition to be there that is sufficient for deletion of guilt; but this person [on the point of death] is less a lord, because in no way lord of the external act of committing sin. Therefore, according to strict justice, an intenser motion is required for his justification than for the justification of someone healthy, although scarcely, however, could he have one as intense.

22. And this reason is touched on by [Ps.-]Augustine in the text [ibid., nn.3, 5 supra], “Do penance while you are healthy. If you do so, you are secure, because you have done it at the time you could have sinned. If you wish to be penitent when you cannot sin, sins have dismissed you, but not you them.” At least you do not as freely dismiss them as the healthy man does. And therefore, the more of freedom there is lacking in you the more is an intenser motion, in strict rigor, required of you, which scarcely or never will you be able to have. Therefore does Augustine say, “a great thing is it for him (if there is anyone) in whom God then inspires true penitence,” because there is scarcely anyone, or there is no one, who may then have the disposition, by congruity, for inspiration to be given him.

C. Two Corollaries

23. From these conclusions follow two corollaries:

One that the healthy man be persuaded to be penitent while healthy, by exciting in himself the fear how dangerous it is to await a late penitence, for the reasons just stated [nn.14, 17, 19, 21].

24. The other corollary, that he who is infirm, now brought to this point [of death], must be persuaded to work, according to his possibility, for an ordered penitence, namely so that, notwithstanding his pain or fear, he use reason as much as he can and strive to have voluntary displeasure for the right end, that is, for the sake of God; and so that he strive against the bad inclination of habit and present delights and labor to have as much displeasure, though brief, as he can have about them; and, so that he not be sent into despair, he must extol the divine mercy, by proposing to himself the example of the thief, whose penance was late but not late his indulgence [n.9].

II. To the Initial Arguments

25. To the first argument [n.3] I say that presumption goes along with what happens for the most part, and it is more apparent to right reason that for the most part it seems difficult or impossible for such a person to repent well because the reasons stated before [nn.14-22]. However, the conclusion of this presumption is not necessary, because the opposite can occur, though for the least part and with difficulty. And therefore does Augustine say [n.3, ibid.], “I do not say that he will be saved, but neither do I say that he will be damned,” because about neither of them can a man be certain.

26. As to the second [n.4]: I concede that he who knowingly exposes himself to risk of his salvation sins mortally; and so this man, if in any elicited act he determine himself never to repent save in extremities, he exposes himself by that act to such risk and sins mortally. But even of that act, if he has so sinned, he can repent in extremities.

27. To the third [n.5] I say that as long as anyone has the use of free choice he can sin with interior (though not exterior) sin, at least by taking pleasure in sins already committed before, and so he can then dismiss the sin by being displeased with it - though it is necessary he not sin with exterior sin; but this too to the extent it can then be voluntary for him to have then the will. But if he could sin with exterior sin he should altogether flee from it, and then he would have about what he committed before not only displeasure but also an additional exterior penitence, at least in desire, should he survive.

28. To the fourth [n.6] I say that a legislator should not pass over things that are in themselves fitting in ordained law though someone take from them occasion to transgress, otherwise God should never have instituted penitence in any law, because someone could take from it opportunity to transgress, which he would not take if he could not afterwards be penitent. Now as to a law ordained simply for this state of fallen nature, it is required that penitence be capable of being fruitful, and a reason it should be so in any instant of health is an equal reason it should be so in extremities; indeed it is more necessary for the imperfect many that it then be of avail to them. I say therefore that this is not an occasion given by the law but only an occasion taken by the imperfect; but in itself it is an occasion for keeping the law out of love for the legislator, who is of so great mercy toward the wretched that he never closes to them the bosom of his mercy.

29. And this response can be confirmed, because when a greater good comes directly from something than a bad comes indirectly from it as from an occasion taken, then it is to be done and in no way left undone because of such occasion. But that some, bad until the end, be saved by penitence is a greater good than the sin is bad that is done by occasion of it, because many through this penitence finally reach the term of divine predestination; but by the occasion of it none fall from that end, and if they sometimes sin, yet not with the sin by which they be finally damned.

30. As to the fifth [n.7]: I concede that this person should be punished by some penalty for his sin. But it should not be imposed on him here, because he cannot fulfill it here; nor should it be imposed on him that he be for so much time in purgatory, because the priest does not have authority to inflict that penalty. But a penalty corresponding to his sins should be proposed to him in this sort of way: ‘if you were healthy, such a penitence would have to be imposed on you, which, if you recover, you are to study to fulfill; but now you are in the hand of God; have confidence in his mercy, because though he punish you, yet he will mercifully punish you’. Or, in a case where it is impossible to protract much talking, there is no need to inform him of any penalty but only to instruct him about the merciful justice of God.

31. As to what is objected against the response [n.8], I say that the case is not alike: for someone dying in mortal sin has nothing holding him back from deserved penalty; but this man dying in charity, yet a debtor for sins committed for which he has not done penitence, does have something holding him back from glory, because no one, while he is debtor to any penalty, can be glorified; for just as glory allows no penalty along with itself so no debt to penalty either, because the penalty is neither to be paid at the same time nor later.